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STATEMENT BY MR. KONSTANTIN GAVRILOV,

HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL,

AT THE 956th PLENARY MEETING OF THE OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION

30 September2020

Agenda item: Security Dialogue

Subject: Modernization of the Vienna Document 2011

Madam Chairperson,

We thank you for organizing and holding a plenary meeting devoted to the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures. We are grateful to the keynote speakers, who presented their perspectives on this complex and multifaceted topic.

We concur with the assessments made by a number of delegations to the effect that the Vienna Document is an instrument that is relevant, “alive” and functioning –one that, despite the challenges of the current times, continues to fulfil the tasks it was originally meant to, and that makes a substantial contribution to the enhancement of transparency and stability in Europe.

Russia pays considerable attention to matters relating to the practical implementation of agreed confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs). Suffice to say that in terms of the number of verification activities hosted, our country is the most scrutinized OSCE participating State. I should like to take this opportunity to thank, on behalf of the Russian verification centre, our partners for the successful co-operation and the professionalism they showed when conducting inspections under the Vienna Document during the COVID-19 pandemic, a period that has not been easy for any of us. We intend to continue this constructive interaction.

We have listened carefully to the presentation on the efforts undertaken by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre to develop a system for information management and reporting in the field of CSBMs and arms control (iMARS). Software of this kind is obviously highly relevant in terms of ensuring that inspectors can go about their work effectively. A similar system has been in operation at the Russian verification centre for a long time, and consequently we do not see any practical benefits for ourselves in becoming involved iniMARS. That being said, we do believe that other participating States, should they be interested, are entitled to continue to participate in the system’s further development on a voluntary basis.

We regret to note that aspects relating to the current implementation of the Vienna Document were not included on the agenda of today’s Security Dialogue. In that regard, we look forward to continuing a lively discussion of these aspects at the annual Meeting of the Heads of Verification Centres in December.

Madam Chairperson,

The Russian Federation’s position regarding the prospects for modernization of the Vienna Document is well known and has not changed. It would not be amiss to recall here that over many years our country has been making a significant contribution to negotiations on CSBMs in Europe. Between 2003 and 2014,we put forward a total of 25 proposals (not counting the various versions) on how to enhance the implementation of the Vienna Document. Yet, for a long time the members of NATO have been shrinking from a substantive discussion of the issues raised by us.

The history of the European security system attests to the fact that the Vienna Document is evolving not in isolation, but, rather, that it is closely interlinked with the overall security situation in Europe. Let us now take a look at the politico-military backdrop against which OSCE participating States are making their pronouncements about the need to modernize the Vienna Document.

The military infrastructure of the United States of America and NATO has moved closer to Russia’s borders. Military contingents are permanently deployed in the Baltic States, Poland and Romania. The establishment of storage facilities in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States to support the deployment and operation of several thousand more troops and the enhancement of “military mobility” to rapidly increase the strike capability of NATO forces in the east –all this is perceived by us as offensive preparations by the Alliance.

There has been an intensification of naval and air force activity of the NATO countries in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea and also in the airspace over their waters. Significantly, up to 40percent of the Alliance’s warships entering the Black Sea are equipped with long-range precision weapons.

I shall cite just a few recent examples of the allegedly “peace-loving” policy of NATO, which proclaims its readiness to “engage in dialogue” with Russia.

On 28August, as planned by the United States Strategic Command, a special military exercise called “Allied Sky 2020” was conducted, in the course of which B-52 strategic bombers carried outa mock strike against targets on Russian territory with air-launched cruise missiles. On 4 and 14September, aircraft of the same type flew over the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to conduct a mock missile strike against targets on the territory of our country’s Southern Military District. From 1 to 10September, a training exercise of the United States armed forces took place in Estonia; it involved the deployment of multiple-launch rocket systems in the immediate vicinity of the Russian border. This list of examples is by no means exhaustive.

We would be curious to hear the answer to the following question: how would the United States react if the Russian military were to conduct such activities near the US border?

To us it is evident that the actions of the United States and its allies are of a hostile and provocative nature, and, what is more, that they may well destabilize the European security situation. In no way do they square with calls for the enhancement of transparency in the military sphere.

The Russian Federation has on several occasions proposed that the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance reduce the intensity of their military activities, limit their training events and move exercise zones away from the Russia-NATO line of contact. We for our part conduct most of our armed forces’ operational and combat training exercises deep inside the country. Unfortunately, it seems that the United States and the other NATO countries are for now not really interested in de-escalating the situation, preventing dangerous military incidents and increasing the predictability of military activities.

We have also pointed out several times that some of the States that co-authored the “package of 34”–that is, the joint proposal for modernization of the Vienna Document supported by 34 participating States –are themselves not particularly solicitous about implementing in full the provisions of the Vienna Document. This refers in particular to the provisions on notifying increases in personnel strength for combat units and formations, including “non-active” ones.

It is also worth mentioning that the CSBM-related instruments have been considerably discredited by Western countries. For example, when these instruments were used in 2014, the States involved failed to identify any unusual military activity or destabilizing concentration of forces in areas adjacent to Ukraine. Nevertheless, groundless accusations continued to be levelled at us all the same. We doubt that this tendency to “devaluate” the CSBM toolbox can be reconciled with the calls by the aforementioned “Group of 34” for that toolbox to be comprehensively updated.

Today, the head of the German verification centre, Brigadier General Peter Braunstein, asked the delegation of the Russian Federation what had to be done so that our country would reconsider its position of principle regarding the prospects for updating the confidence-building measures. The answer is obvious. In order to create conditions for a discussion on CSBMs, the Alliance must desist from intensifying its activity on the eastern flank and then scale it down. Once military tensions have been reduced, the policy of sanctions revoked and, finally, trust restored, it will become possible to consider this matter again. A predictable environment is needed for negotiations on military security. For example, the commitment of all States Parties to refrain from any steps to change the level, configuration and deployment of forces was a key condition for launching and conducting the negotiation process on the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1996 to 1999).

For the time being, though, given the current security environment, the door to modernization of the Vienna Document 2011 remains closed.

We call on our partners to fulfil their obligations unconditionally and to create a favourable atmosphere for further joint work. As we see it, there is a lot for them to ponder over: they must choose whether their priority is to be “containment” of Russia by force or whether it is to be dialogue with our country, notably on a wide range of issues related to CSBMs. One cannot have one’s cake and eat it too.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.